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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BENTLEY WILSON,

;

Petitioner/Appellant,

]

vs.

)
)

BRENDA HALTON WILSON,

)

Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 20070359-CA

]

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2001 as Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues raised by the Appellant are as follows:
First, does the adoption of the Appellee's position that the alimony and child
support terms of the temporary order survived the entry of the Amended Decree render
the Amended Findings of Fact defective and legally insufficient.
" c[0]rders . . . setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed/ [and thus, the Court]
review[s] alimony awards under an abuse of discretion standard." Olsen v. Olsen, 169
P.3d 765 (Utah App.,2007) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985)).
Similarly, the Court reviews modifications of alimony under an abuse of discretion
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standard. See Sill v. Sill, 164 P.3d 173 (Utah App. 2007). To the extent questions of law
are concerned, they are reviewed for correctness. See id Alimony must be based upon
detailed findings related to the statutory elements. Id,
Similarly, child support orders must be based upon the statutory factors contained
in U.C.A. 78-45-7 (1998 as Amended).

Because the determination of those factors

involves questions of fact, the Court examines the trial court's findings of fact and defers
to those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909
(Utah App. 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). It is well-established
that "[fjailure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error
unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontrovcrted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment.5 "Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 137 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). In addition, "[t]he findings
'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.' " Id. (quoting
Ruckerv. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)).
Second, is a stipulation of the parties that is in derogation of the parties' burden to
present evidence regarding alimony and child support and conflicts with the duty of the
trial court to enter specific findings, enforceable. Questions about the legal adequacy of
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of law,
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which we review for correctness." Wall v. Wall, 157 P.3d 341 (Utah App.,2007); Van Dyke
v. Van Dyke, 86 P.3d 767 (Utah App. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted).
Third, did the trial court commit error when it interpreted the language contained
in the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree as incorporating the
alimony and child support obligations established in the temporary order of August 11,
2004.
The Court interprets the language in a divorce decree according to established
rules of contract interpretation. Cf. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah
Ct.App.1990). In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995),
the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[w]hen determining whether a contract is ambiguous,
any relevant evidence must be considered." Id. at 268. A court must "consider the writing
in light of the surrounding circumstances." Id. If the court considers such evidence and
determines that the language of the contract is unambiguous, "then the parties' intentions
must be determined solely from the language of the contract." Id. "Language in a written
document is ambiguous if the words used may be understood to support two or more
plausible meanings." Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60 (emphasis added); see also R & R
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) (" T o
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable.' "
(citation omitted)). Finally, whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which
the reviewing court reviews for corcectness. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d
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1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996).
Fourth, as a matter of equity as required by the statutes authorizing alimony and
child support, are the parties entitled to a hearing on the merits to determine the
appropriate amount of child support and alimony to be effective with the entry of the
decree of divorce in this matter.
The trial court's ruling regarding alimony and child support is reviewed by the
Appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Howell v. Howell, 806
P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE LOWER COURT
Each of the issues was fully preserved by the Appellant/Petitioner in the lower
court in his

legal memorandum, formal Objection and argument at the hearings

conducted by the Commissioner and Judge Stott. (R. 575-605; 611-12; 613-644; Hearing
Transcript 1/2/2007, R. 811; Hearing Transcript 9/18/2006, R. 810)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutes that the Petitioner/Appellant deem determinative of the issues raised
in this matter include the following.
First as to the required elements and findings to support a child support award,
U.C.A. 78-45-7(2)-(4) (1998 as Amended) provides:
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has
occurred, or a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6)
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has been filed, the court determining the amount of prospective support
shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing
award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but
not limited to: (a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; (b) the
relative wealth and income of the parties; (c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; (e) the ability of an incapacitated adult
child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult child or on the adult
child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; (f) the needs of the
obligee, the obligor, and the child; (g) the ages of the parties; and (h) the
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in
this chapter.
Second, as to the required elements and findings to support an alimony award,
U.C.A. 30-3-5(8) (2006 as Amended) provides:

(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii)
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability
of the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v)
whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to
attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
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with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After the entry of Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended
Decree, a dispute arose between the parties as to the scope of the issues reserved therein
for future hearing. The Respondent maintained that the alimony and child support levels
established under the temporary order, predating the Decree and Amended Decree,
continued through and were incorporated in the Amended Decree. Thus, the Respondent
maintained that she was entitled to a determination of arrearages, based upon the alimony
and child support payments ordered under the temporary order of August 11, 2004.
The Appellant/Petitioner maintained that the child support and alimony levels
established in the temporary order terminated upon the entry of the Decree and Amended
Decree and that he was entitled to a hearing establishing the child support and alimony
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levels effective with the entry of the Decree and Amended Decree based upon the then
existing conditions of the parties. The Appellant contended that the provision in the
Amended Decree allowing him six months to pursue a reduction in child support and
alimony referred only to his right to seek a reduction in the temporary child support and
alimony from the date of the Temporary Order to the date the Decree was entered in the
matter. Petitioner further contended that the findings of fact contained in the Decree and
Amended Decree were legally insufficient to support an award of alimony and child
support.
Commissioner Patton heard the matter and adopted the position of the
Respondent/Appellee. Appellant/Petitioner filed an Objection to the recommendation and
Judge Stott, in reviewing the Objection, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and
a Judgment, which, for the most part, adopted the position of the Respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

General Background of the Parties and the Action.

The Complaint for divorce was filed by the Appellant/Petitioner on December 19,
2003. The parties, as recited in the complaint for divorce, were married on July 30, 1984.
Four children were bom as issue of the marriage, only three of whom were minors at the
time of filing. l (R. 19-20)

i

Daile Christina Wilson, born November 12, 1984 (23 yrs. old); Madelyne Anne
Wilson, born September 11, 1988 (19 yrs. old); Bentley Dunford Wilson II, born
7

B.

The August 11, 2004 Order of Temporary Support.

After the filing of the Complaint, the parties filed various motions for temporary
orders. Those motions were resolved with the preparation and execution of a Stipulation
of Temporaiy Support, which was filed with the trial court on June 24, 2004. (R. 55-57;
Addendum, Exhibit "A")

The terms of the stipulation were reduced to an Order of

Temporary Support, filed with the court on August 11, 2004. (R. 98-101; Addendum,
Exhibit "A") Central to the issues raised in this appeal, the Order of Temporaiy Support
provided:
. . . 2. Custody/Parent time. The Mother [Respondent] is awarded
temporaiy physical custody of the minor children, subject to the Father's
[Petitioner] right to parent time with the children at reasonable times and
places as the parties may agree. The holidays will be alternated in
accordance with U.C.A.. 30-3-35; however, the wishes of the children will
be considered and the children will not be forced to participate in parent
time. The Father will have alternating weekends with the children from
Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday. . . The Father will also have one week of
extended visitation with the children in the summer.
3. Child Support. The Father represents his gross monthly income is
approximately $10,000 per month.
The Respondent is currently
unemployed. The Father will pay child support of $700 per month per
child. The child support obligation of the Father shall be effective June 1,
2004 [the month in which the stipulation was reached], and continue during
the pendency of this action. Each party will pay one-half [of] all costs of
extracurricular activities for the children.

September 11, 1993 (14 yrs. old); and, William McKinlcy Wilson, born May 6, 1997
(lOyrs. old).
8

4. Credit. The Petitioner shall receive credit for all child support amounts
paid in June, which was $2,250.
5. Alimony. The Wife is awarded a sum of $4,000 per month as temporary
alimony from the Husband, commencing June 1, 2004, and continuing
during the pendency of this action. . . .
R. 98-101; Addendum, Exhibit "A".
C.

The August 26, 2004 Order on Order to Show Cause,

After the stipulation that was reached in June, 2004 (resulting in the August 11,
2004 Order), an order to show cause was personally served on the Respondent by the
Petitioner requiring her attendance at a hearing before the domestic relations
commissioner on August 5, 2004. The Respondent neither appeared in person or nor
through counsel at the appointed time and the Commissioner granted the request of the
Petitioner for relief under his request for temporary orders. (R. 97).
The Order on Order to Show Cause, authorized at the August 5, 2004 hearing, was
actually signed and entered in the court record on August 26, 2004. (R. 107-109,
Addendum, Exhibit "B") The Order, signed by both the Commissioner and the assigned
district court judge, provided in relevant part, as follows:
1. The Petitioner is hereby granted the temporary physical custody of the
minor children. . . . (Emphasis added)
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A stipulation and order was entered by the court, on September 24, 2004,
orchestrating visitation by the Respondent pending the scheduled hearing on September
28, 2004. (R. 287-294)
D.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree Dated
October 7, 2004.

On September 28, 2004, the parties, in the course of negotiating the pending
motions and orders to show cause, were able to resolve all the issues attendant to the
divorce action, and a stipulation was stated on the record. (R. 295)
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, memorializing
the stipulation of the parties were filed on October 7, 2004. (R. 313-339; Addendum,
Exhibit "C") The relevant language in the Decree is as follows:
3. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted joint legal custody of
he minor children, with the Respondent being designated as having the
primary physical custody of the minor children. [Paragraph 4 then recited in
detail the Petitioner's visitation rights] . . .
6. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and
alimony. The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be
reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain
further information regarding the Petitioner's actual income.
7. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court.
8. The financial, real and personal property issues are reserved. . . .
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14. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by
the trial court.
Id.
E.

The Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
Dated November 2, 2004.

On November 2, 2004, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree were entered in accordance with the stipulation of the parties. (R. 347-370;
Addendum, Exhibit "D") The changes in the language cited above are highlighted below:
3. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted joint legal custody of
he minor children, with the Respondent being designated as having the
primary physical custody of the minor children. [Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6
then recite in detail the Petitioner's visitation rights and parenting plan] .. .
8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which
has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and
alimony which has been ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month.
The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved
for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income.
9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court.
10. All other issues are reserved.
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by
the trial court. (Emphasis added)
Id.
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F.

Proceedings Resulting in the Judgment Against Petitioner

Counsel for the Petitioner withdrew and no action was taken until a request for
pretrial conference, filed by the Respondent, resulted in the reappearance of counsel for
the Petitioner and a pretrial conference on December 8, 2005. (R. 447, 458-59, 461, 46667) At the pretrial conference, the Petitioner was ordered to comply with discovery
requests sent by thee Respondent by January 3, 2006. (R. 466-67) An Order
memorializing the commissioner's ruling was entered on January 19, 2006. (R. 471-73)
At the continued pretrial conference on January 31, 2006, the parties represented
that discovery has been completed and that the parties needed additional time to review
the exchanged information. (R. 474) On July 20, 2006, counsel for the Respondent is
ordered to prepare a pretrial order. (R. 511) In a telephonic conference held on August 22,
2006, the lawyers for the parties represented to the court that discovery had not yet been
completed and the matter was continued without date. (R. 546)
Counsel for the Respondent, in a counter-affidavit, which was primarily addressing
the ongoing visitation issues, made a claim for arrearages based upon the child support
and alimony payment levels established under the Temporary Order of August 11, 2004.
(R. 549-57) The Petitioner filed an Objection to Hearing and Motion to Strike Request for
Judgment. (R. 575-605)
On September 18, 2006, the minutes recite that the Commissioner found that the
Respondent was entitled to all arrearages based upon the child support and alimony award
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set out in the August 11, 2004 temporary order. Commissioner Patton held that the
Temporary Order from August 11, 2004 was not modified and remained in force and that
it continued to be in force. Commissioner Patton recommended an order reflecting that
the Appellant/Petitioner failed to take any action during the six months in which he could
have altered the Temporary Order. Commissioner Patton recommended a judgment be
entered for past due alimony and child support in the amount of $108,116.00 through
September 6, 2006. (R. 611-12) The oral ruling was reduced to an Order and Judgment
that was filed on October 25, 2006. (R. 657-661; Addendum, Exhibit "E")
The Petitioner filed an Objection to the recommendation of the Commissioner on
September 20, 2006. (R. 606-654) Oral arguments on the Objection were conducted by
Judge Gary D. Stott on January 2, 2007 and the court took the matter under advisement.
(R. 686; R. 811 (transcript of January 2, 2007 argument))
Judge Stott entered his Ruling on January 10, 2007 (R. 687-692) The Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment memorializing Judge Stott's Ruling were entered
March 27, 2007. (R. 798-804; Addendum, Exhibit "F")
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of March 27, 2007,
provided as follows:
1.
On August 11, 2004, a Temporary Order was entered regarding
alimony and child support. In that Order respondent was given temporary
physical custody and Petitioner was awarded visitation. In that Order child
support was set for $700 per-month per-child and $4,000 per-month of
alimony was awarded to Respondent.
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2.
On August 26, 2004, custody was changed to the Petitioner and
Respondent was given visitation.
3.
On September 22, 2004, another order was entered into a Stipulation
which resulted in a Decree of Divorce, which was signed and entered on
October 7, 2004. It appears that Petitioner had custody of the children from
August 26, 2004 to October 7, 2004.
4.
The Divorce Decree changed custody from the Petitioner to the
Respondent. The Decree reserved the issue of what amounts Petitioner
needed to pay for the months of August and September of 2004. The
section of the Decree that is most germane to this Ruling is paragraph eight
which reads:
The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and
alimony. The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted
shall be reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able
to obtain further information regarding Petitioner's actual income.
(Emphasis added)
5.
Six months came and passed and the Petitioner failed to file a
document with the court, or make any attempt to verify his allegedly
modified income.
6.
The Commissioner held a hearing on September 18, 2006, wherein
he considered the facts that are presently before this court. The
Commissioner held in part that 1) the Temporary Order from August 11,
2004, was not modified and remained in force, 2) Petitioner had failed to
take any action during the six months in which he could have altered the
Temporary Order, 3) Petitioner owed $108,116.00 through September,
2006.
7.
The Commissioner's decision was based on the information provided
by the parties and appellate court decisions. The commissioner discussed
the Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987), case, but found that the
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Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992) decision was
more applicable to the facts before the court. The Commissioner noted that
Whitehead stood for the general rule that "once temporary support
obligations become due, they are no more retroactively modifiable than
final decrees" but also provided for some exceptions to this rule. The
Commissioner noted that Petitioner asked the court to "carve out an
exception to the general rule prohibiting retroactive modification of family
support obligations." Id. at 816. It was the finding of the Commissioner
that the time for applying any such exception to the general rule lapsed
when Petitioner failed to act within the six months contemplated by the
Divorce Decree.
He therefore entered Judgment in favor of the
Respondent, holding Petitioner responsible for any and all obligations for
which he could not provide proof of payment for within two weeks.
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, hereby enters the
following Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
1.
Having carefully considered the Commissioner findings, the relevant
case law, and the arguments offered by the parties the Petitioner's Objection
is granted in part, and denied in part.
2.
The judgment recommended by the Commissioner was $108,116.00.
This court is persuaded that Petitioner should not be responsible for the
child support payments from August 26, 2004, to October 7, 2004, when the
Divorce Decree was signed. This court is aware that child support orders
typically remain in force despite a temporary custody change, as agreed by
the parties. In this instance, however, the court will excuse Petitioner from
payment of child support for a month and a half, which is effectively the
amount of time he had custody of the children. The exact amount excused
is $700 per-child for the month, and $350 per-child for the half month. It
should be noted, however, that Petitioner is still responsible for alimony for
this time period. Therefore, Judgment is granted to the Respondent,
Brenda Wilson, against the Petitioner in the amount of SI07,066.00 for his
past child support and alimony obligations owed through September 2006.
3.
This court does not believe that the Commissioner wrongfully
entered judgment based on Temporary Orders that were superseded by the
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Divorce Decree, and thereby denies this portion of Petitioner's objection.
This decision is supported by the Divorce Decree and the relevant case law.
4.
Petitioner alleges that the "temporary orders merged into the Decree
of Divorce and cannot be enforced when the Decree of Divorce does not
specifically continue the temporary orders." Petitioner discussed the case
of Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987) which holds that, "payments
that become due and payable under a temporary order may be reduced to
judgment after entry of the final decree, despite the failure of that decree to
expressly preserve them." Petitioner argues that this holding is inapplicable
to the present facts because the "Decree is specifically different than the
temporary orders."

5.
While the Decree and Order are different they are not mutually
exclusive, and in fact the Decree implicitly adopts the Temporary Order.
Paragraph eight demonstrates this when it notes, (t)he Petitioner has
requested a reduction in both child support and alimony. The issue of
whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved for period of
six months so that each party is able to obtain further information regarding
Petitioner's actual income.

6.
In order for an award to be reduced the award must have existed in
the first place. This paragraph implicitly acknowledges that Petitioner is
seeking a reduction of the Temporary Order. The $700 per-child and
$4,000 in alimony are the only amounts that had ever been entered and are
logically the amounts referred to in the Decree.
7.
As the Whitehead court observed there are some exceptions to the
general rule prohibiting the modification of temporary support obligations,
however, Petitioner cannot avail himself of these exceptions. As the Decree
notes, the Petitioner had six months to provide accurate information
regarding his income and thereby adjust the wards entered in the Temporary
Order. Petitioner failed to take any action during this time when the
possibility of modification existed.
It is therefore disingenuous for
Petitioner to now claim that the inclusion of the Temporary Order in the
Decree was wrongful when its inclusion was the direct result of his
inaction.
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8.
In Summary, the Objection to ihe Commissioner's recommendation
is granted in part and denied in part. The Objection is well taken inasmuch
as Petitioner should not owe for the amount of time the children were in his
custody. The Objection is denied, however, as it relates to inclusion of ihe
Temporary Order in the Divorce Decree. It is the finding of this court that
the Temporary Order entered on August 11, 2004, was implicitly adopted
by Decree of Divorce and that the Judgment entered by the Commissioner
was correct with the excused amounts listed in paragraph 2 in this section
entitled Conclusions of Law and Judgment above.
Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant contends first that the construction of the Temporary Order and
Amended Decree urged by the Respondent/Appellee would require a determination that
the Decree and Amended Decree are defective and legally insufficient, because of the
lack of the required findings of fact. A legally sufficient determination of child support
and alimony requires a detailed delineation of elements that are entirely missing from the
Temporary Order and Amended Findings of Fact.

Appellant's contention that the

Amended Decree preserved the issue of alimony and child support determination for a
future date, creates a mechanism, consistent with the law, where the trial court could
conduct a hearing and make the required findings of fact regarding the income, needs and
other circumstances of the parties relevant to a child support and alimony determination
that was to commence with the entry of the decree of divorce.
The Temporary Order of August 11, 2004 and the subsequent Amended Findings
were based upon the stipulation of the parties. However, a stipulation of the paities
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cannot waive or negate the responsibility of the parties to provide evidence regarding the
relevant factors for detemiining child support and alimony. Further, the trial court's duty
to enter detailed findings regarding alimony and chid support and its continuing
jurisdiction cannot be waived or limited by a stipulation of the parties. Based thereon,
any construction of the Amended Findings that would carryover the terms of the
temporary order would be contrary to the obligation of the trial court to enter detailed
findings based upon the evidence to support child support and alimony determinations.
The only way the factual scenario in this case can be interpreted, consistent with the
duties of the parties and the trial court, is that the terms of the temporary order terminated
upon the entry of the decree and that the court reserved for further hearing the issue as to
the amount of child support and alimony that were to take effect upon the entry of the
decree.
Third, the trial court erred in its interpretation of the language contained in the
Amended Findings, Conclusions and Decree. Applying the same rules applicable to the
interpretation of a contract, this Court should determine that the terms of the temporary
order of August 11, 2004, terminated upon the entry of Decree in this matter. Further,
this Court should adjudge that the determination of child support and alimony levels, to
be effective with the entry of the decree, were reserved for future determination. In fact,
that conclusion is supported by the efforts of the parties to conduct discovery on their
respective income and expenses. If the trial court found the language in the amended
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decree ambiguous, it should have allowed an evidentiary hearing as to the intent of the
parties.
Fourth, based upon the mandate contained in the relevant statutes and case law, the
equities of this case certainly entitle the parties to a fair hearing where all the evidence as
to income, expenses and the other statutory factors can be heard by the court and a fair
and legally supportable order entered therefrom.

The evidence submitted by affidavit

from the exchanged discovery reveals that the terms of the temporary order regarding the
levels of alimony and child support are not supported by the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT ARE DEFICIENT
AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AND CHILD
SUPPORT AWARD CONTAINED IN THE TEMPORARY ORDER.
It is the Appellant's position that the trial court reserved, in the Amended Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree, the determination of the alimony and
child support levels that would commence effective with the entry of the divorce decree
in this matter.

The adoption of the Appellee's position that seeks to carry over the

determination of the temporary award of child support and alimony, into the Amended
Decree, would result in factually unsupported and legally deficient findings of fact.
A.

The Amended Findings of Fact are Bereft of the Required
Elements,
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The Appellant submits that the Amended Findings of Fact do not contain or even
reference the elements required to support an award of child support and alimony. (R.
347-370; Addendum, Exhibit "D") This is not a case where the sufficiency of die
underlying findings supporting an award of child support or alimony are at issue. Rather,
this is a case where there are no relevant findings on the issues related to the award of
child support and alimony.
The Temporary Order of August 11, 2004 also does not contain a single relevant
finding. The only relevant language contained in the Temporary Order is that "[t]he
Father represents his gross monthly income is approximately $10,000 per month. The
Respondent is currently unemployed." (R. 98-101; Addendum, Exhibit "A")

The

Commissioner did not even make any findings in the Temporary Order based upon the
representations of the "approximate" income. The Amended Findings are also silent in
converting any representations of the parties into factual findings.
B.

This Requirement of Detailed Findings to Support an Award of
Alimony and Child Support is Clear in Utah Law.
1.

Findings Requirements for a Child Support Award

The requirement of specific findings to support a child support award are statutory.
U.C.A. 78-45-7(2) and (3) (1998 as Amended) provides:
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has
occurred, or a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6)
has been filed, the court determining the amount of prospective support
shall require each parly to file a proposed award of child support using the
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guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing
award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but
not limited to: (a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; (b) the
relative wealth and income of the parties; (c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; (e) the ability of an incapacitated adult
child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult child or on the adult
child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; (f) the needs of the
obligee, the obligor, and the child; (g) the ages of the parties; and (h) the
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon the Unifomi Child Support Guidelines described in
this chapter.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that because the statutory factors involve
questions of fact, the reviewing court must examine the trial court's findings of fact and
defer to those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1987). However, it is welJ-established that "[fjailure of the trial court to make
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.5 "
Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). In addition, "[tjhe findings 'should be sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion
on each factual issue was reached.5

55

Id. (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338

(Utah 1979)).
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The Court in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988), was clear that
U.C.A. 78-45-7 requires the trial court to consider at least the seven factors listed therein.
Further, the Court held, those factors constitute material issues upon which the trial court
must enter findings of fact.

Finally, although "trial courts have broad discretion in

selecting an appropriate method of assessing a spouse's income . . . {Griffith v. Griffith,
985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999), . . . the trial court must make detailed findings on all material
issues, ... which 'should ... include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Rehn v\ Rehn 974 P.2d 306
(Utah App. 1999) (second omission in original) (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d
952, 958 (Utah Ct.App.1988)).
There can be no question that the Amended Findings of Fact in this case fail to
include even one relevant finding on the required elements of a \alid child support order.
2.

Findings Requirements for an Alimony Award

The elements that a trial court must consider with regard to the award o^ alimony
are also statutory. U.C.A. 30-3-5(8) (2006 as Amended) provides:
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (hi) the ability of
the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v)
whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
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education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to
attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony.
Id.
As noted in Olsen v. Olsen, 586 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 2007) (quoting
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985)) and Sill v. Sill 164 P.3d 17? (Utah
App. 2007, Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires trial courts to consider "'al least1'
certain named factors, including, in part: "(i) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; [and]
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(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)(iii) (Supp.2007); see also Rehti v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999) (In determining
the amount of alimony, "a trial court must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the
earning capacity of the recipient spouse; [and] the ability of the obligor spouse to provide
support.").
Further, the same case law requires trial courts to make findings on each of the
factors. The "findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree follows
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 764 (Utah
App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A trial court's failure to provide adequate
findings is reversible error when the facts are not clear from the record." Id. In Andrus,
this Court reversed and remanded where the findings of fact did not address the husband's
"tax obligations and monthly net income," and the "'trial court's findings of fact [were] not
sufficiently detailed to show the steps it took determining Husband's disposable income."
Id.
Again, there is no question that the Amended Findings of Fact do not contain a
factual finding as to any of the required elements.
C

Only the Adoption of the Appellant's Position Secures the Legal
Sufficiency of the Amended Findings,
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Appellant submits that there can be no question as to the insufficiency of the
underlying Amended Findings, if this Court were adopt the argument urged by Appellee.
If the two sentences dedicated to alimony and child support, in the Temporary Order of
August 11, 2004, were intended by the trial court to comprise the total findings on
alimony and child support, there is simply no arguable basis upon which to urge their
legal sufficiency under the statutes and case law detailed above.
On the other hand, if the temporary order was to terminate effective with the entry
of the decree of divorce and if the reservation of issues included in the Amended Decree
was construed to include the determination of alimony and child support awards to be
effective from the date of the decree, there would be no legal insufficiency in the findings
as it relates to child support and alimony. This matter would simply be remanded for a
hearing on the relevant factors to aid the trial court in determining the necessary facts to
support a legally defensible alimony and child support award.
POINT II: THE AMENDED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECREESHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO DEPRIVE THE COURT OF
JURISDICTION TO MAKE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT FINDINGS
There is no question that the terms of the Temporary Order dated August 11, 2004
and the Amended Findings'of Fact were based upon the stipulation of the parties. The
relevant language, as it relates to the child support and alimony, contained in the
Amended Findings is as follows:
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8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which
has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and
alimony which has been ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month.
The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved
for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income.
9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court.
10. All other issues are reserved.
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by
the trial court. (Emphasis added)
(R. 347-370; Addendum, Exhibit "D")
If, as the Appellee urges, the intent of the Amended Findings was to carry over the
alimony and child support obligations from the August 11 Temporary Order into the
Amended Decree, such as interpretation would conflict with the trial court's statutory
obligation of entering the required findings regardless of the terms of the stipulation of
the parties.
The controlling statutes and case law require the trial court to take testimony and
receive evidence preparatory to entering the statutorily required findings related to child
support and alimony. The Appellee is arguing that the parties stipulated to the cany-over
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of the temporary order provisions into the Amended Decree, thereby eliminating the
responsibility of the trial court to make the requisite findings of fact.
The case law is clear however, that the parties may not so stipulate to deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction and its statutory obligation. In Sill v. Sill, 164 P.3d 415 (Utah
App.,2007), the Court considered the enforceability of a non-modification clause2 and
determined that the non-modification clause, even if incorporated into a decree does not
divest the trial court of its statutory continuing jurisdiction. Id.
In Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 754 (Utah App.,2007), the husband challenged the
trial court's decision to adhere to a portion of a stipulation, which precluded consideration
of the wife's income in calculating child support payments. Id. The Court analyzed the
matter as follows:
Utah Code sections 78-45-3 and 78-45-4 respectively require every father
and every mother to provide support to their children. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-45-3 to-4 (2002). 'The right to support from the parents belongs to
the minor children and is not subject to being bartered away, extinguished,
estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the
parents." Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 51 7 (Utah 1981). Parents have "the
duty to support the children fthey] ha[ve] brought into the world. This duty
is inalienable and [parents] cannot rid [themselves] of it by purporting to
transfer it to someone else, by contract or otherwise." Gulley v. Galley, 570
P.2d 127, 128-29 (Utah 1977).

The subject settlement agreement included a stipulation specifying that "[t]he
provisions of th[e] [Ajgreement shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of
Divorce which implements it with the sole exception that if all of the assets have not
been disclosed and divided in th[e] [Ajgreement, those may be brought back before
the [c]ourt for appropriate disposition." Id.
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Ill both Hills and Galley, the Utah Supreme Court addressed efforts of a
parent who had attempted to contract away the duty to provide child
support. See Hills, 638 P.2d at 516; Gulley, 570 P.2d at 128. The court held
that the right to receive child support lies with the minor children, not with
the spouse who receives the funds on the children's behalf, and it is
therefore not a right either parent may "barter[ ] away" or uextinguish[ ]."
Hills, 638 P.2d at 517; see also Gulley, 570 P.2d at 129. Although Hills and
Gulley addressed the duty of a father to provide support, we see no reason
why the analysis should not apply equally to both parents.
Here, while Paragraph 6 does not expressly relieve Wife of her duty to
provide support, it effectively puts the entire burden of supporting the
children on Husband, no matter how much income Wife earns. Taken to the
extreme, Paragraph 6 would require Husband to fully support the children
even in the event that Wife begins to earn more money than Husband
because Wife's income could not be considered in any petition to modify
based on a change of circumstances. The trial court's decision to apply
Paragraph 6, even after the other provisions dealing with alimony and
child support were invalidated, was an abuse of discretion because it
allows Wife to avoid her statutory and inalienable common law duty to
provide financial support to her children. We therefore remand to the
trial court with instructions to consider Wife's income in the
calculation of Husband's monthly child support payments. (Lvmphasis
added)
Id.
In discussing the alimony component, the Sill Court expressly invalidated the use
of only gross income (the estimate of which was the only indicator of income in the
Temporary Order or the Amended Findings) in determining alimony:
Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating his
alimony obligations based on his gross monthly income instead of his net
income. Specifically, Husband claims that the trial court improperly ignoied
his duty to pay taxes and thereby mistakenly overestimated his disposable
income. In determining alimony, a trial court must consider, along with
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other factors not under attack in the instant appeal, "the ability of the payor
spouse to provide support." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii)
(Supp.2007). A trial court's " 'findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached/ " Rasband v. Rash andt 752 P.2d 1331,
1334 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987)) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A trial court's
failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error when the facts are
not clear from the record. See id. at 1334-35 (vacating an alimony award
and remanding for adequate findings).
Here, the trial court arrived at its alimony award by awarding Wife
half of Husband's monthly disposable income. The trial court
determined Husband's disposable income by subtracting certain
expenses, including housing, food, transportation, and child support,
from Husband's stipulated gross monthly income. The findings of fact
are silent on the issue of Husband's tax obligations and monthly net
income* Even though there is some evidence in the record concerning
the amount of taxes Husband pays, including testimony by Wife and
documentary evidence provided by Husband, we cannot ascertain how
or if the trial court contemplated Husband's duty to pay taxes in
calculating his disposable income. The trial court's findings of fact are
not sufficiently detailed to show the steps it took determining
Husband's disposable income. We therefore reverse and remand for
adequate findings that will show proper consideration of Husband's net
income. (Emphasis added)
Id.
Simply, the stipulation of the parties, in this case, relating to alimony and child
support, cannot be construed to relieve the trial court and the parties from their respective
duties of providing evidence and making detailed findings. Clearly, if the constraction
urged by Lhe Appellee is upheld, the trial court committed error in allowing the
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unsupported stipulation of the parties to act as a substitute for detailed findings of fact
that arc supported by the record in the case. Also, the decision cited above expressly
rejects the only evidence in this case (the Petitioner's approximation of gross income in
June, 2004) that was used as a basis of the alimony and child support award.
On the other hand, the construction urged by the Appellant, that the trial court
reserved the determination of alimony and child support for future hearings, is entirely
consistent with the non-waivable duty of the parties to submit evidence and the duty of
the trial court to authorize specific findings. In accordance with that construction, the
matter would be remanded for a hearing on the relevant factors to establish the child
support and alimony levels that were to commence on the entry of the decree of divorce.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT LEVELS ESTABLISHED
IN THE TEMPORARY ORDER WERE INCORPORATED
BY THE AMENDED DECREE.
The language at issue in this case, from the Amended Findings of Fact The
relevant language, as it relates to the child support and alimony, contained in the
Amended Findings is as follows:
8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which
has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and
alimony which has been ordered in the amount of §4,000.00 per month.
The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved
for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income.
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9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court.
10. All other issues are reserved.
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by
the trial court. (Emphasis added)
(R. 347-370; Addendum, Exhibit "D")
A.

The Appellant/Petitioner's interpretation of the Relevant
Language.

The Appellant contends that the Amended Findings are unambiguous.

If the

clauses recited above, are read together, in context, it is submitted that there is only one
reasonable way for the language to bed interpreted. The parties could not, and did not
intend, to divest the trial court of its obligation of hearing the necessary evidence
regarding the income and expenses of the parties and the other factors relevant to a
determination of child support and alimony. It is clear from the record that the parties
had not yet engaged in discovery regarding those factors and did not have sufficient
information to even file a child support worksheet3 with the proposed Amended Finding,

3

U.C.A. 78-45-7.3(1) (2000 as Amended) requires that "[i]n any matter in which child
support is ordered, the moving party shall submit: (a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); (c) a written
statement indicating whether or not the amount of child support requested is
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Conclusions and Amended Decree. Neither attorney for the parties could have even
recommended a specific child support or alimony award based upon the absence of any
documentation.
Accordingly, the intent of the provisions contained in the Amended Findings was
first, to allow the Petitioner six months to provide evidence in support of his claim that
the child support and alimony award, established in the temporary order of August 11,
2004 (which was effective from June 1, 2004 to the date of the Decree, October 7, 2004),
should be reduced based upon the significant decline in his income he had experienced
after the stipulation supporting the August 11, 2004 order was signed in June, 2004.
Appellant contends that the six month window related only to his right to challenge the
terms of the temporary order that terminated with the entry of the Decree on October 7,
2004.
Second, Appellant contends that the determination of child support and alimony,
that were to be effective with the entry of the Decree, on October 7, 2004, was reserved
with the other financial issues by Paragraphs 10 and 16. Finally, Paragraph 9 of the
Amended Findings is entirely consistent with the position of the Appellant in that it
carves out also, the period of time from the stipulation resulting in the temporary order,
June, 2004 to October 2004 for the consideration of the effect of Appellant having

consistent with the guidelines; and (d) the information required under Subsection (3).
See also, Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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custody of the children during those two months. The reason the court reserved the child
support amount for August and September, 2004, is because the Appellant/Petitioner had
custody during those two months and because the Appellant had reserved the right to
demonstrate that the base amount entered in the temporary order should be modified
based upon his decrease in income.
When the Appellant did not press the issue, because of the inability to pay attorney
fees, within the six-month period of time, all that was lost, in the Appellant's view, was
his right to contest the amount of alimony and child support during the period from June,
2004 to the entry of the Decree in October, Appellant always believed that the level of
support, effective with October, 2004, would be established at a new hearing.
B.

The Appellant's Interpretation is Supported by the Case Law
Regarding Interpretation of Decrees.

As noted in Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah App.,1998) (overturned on
other grounds), the court interprets a divorce decree according to established rales of
contract interpretation. Cf.

fffyitehouse

v. Wliitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah

Ct.App.1990). In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995),
the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the analysis that courts must use in determining
whether a contract is ambiguous: "When determining whether a contract is ambiguous,
any relevant evidence must be considered." Id. at 268. A court must "consider the writing
in light of the surrounding circumstances." Id However, if the court considers such
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evidence and detemiines that the language of the contract is unambiguous, "then the
parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract." Id.
"Language in a written document is ambiguous if the words used may be understood to
support two or mors plausible meanings." Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60 (emphasis added);
see also R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) ("
c

To demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable.' "

(citation omitted)). Finally, whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which
the reviewing court reviews for correctness. See Intenvest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d
1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996).
It is submitted that based upon the wording of the Amended Findings, the
interpretation offered by the Appellant is reasonable, consistent with the law that the trial
court must enter detailed findings supported by the evidence, and in keeping with the
intent of the parties, as abstracted from the document.
If, however, the Court finds that the language is capable of more than one
interpretation, the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the intent of
the parties.
C.

The Appellant's Interpretation
Subsequent Actions of the Parties.

is

Consistent

with

the

The record in this case reveals that the Decree was entered on October 7, 2004.
Six months would have expired in April, 2005.
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If the Respondent/Appellee really

believed that the alimony and child support levels from the temporary order were
intended, but for the six-month right of the Appellant, to continue on after the entry of the
Decree and Amended Decree, there would have been no reason to conduct discovery
related to the income and expenses of the parties. However, the Record reflects that the
Respondent/Appellee was sending discovery requests in August, 2005, long after the
expiration of the six-month period. (R. 445) In fact, on August 19, 2005, the Respondent
filed eleven (11) subpoenas duces tecum addressed to the Appellant's employers, banks
and other sourced from which the information required to assess alimony and child
support could be obtained. (R. 379-444)
The Pretrial Conference held on December 8, 2005, primarily dealt with the
demands of each of the parties regarding discovery. Respondent actually obtained an
Order detailing the Appellant/Petitioner's obligation to supply requested information on
January 9, 2006. (R. 471-473) Ongoing discovery was discussed in the Pretrial
Conference of January 31, 2006. (R. 474) The Petitioner/Appellant was conducting
discovery on the income and expenses of the Respondent in January, 2006 (R. 475-80).
Importantly, the only issue that could possible have been referred to in the
Amended Findings' reservation of issues, was the assessment of child support and
alimony.

There were no other financial or other issues existing at the time of the

Amended Decree.
D.

The Appellant's Interpretation is Consistent with the Law
Regarding the Expiration of Temporary Orders.
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In Druce v. Druce 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
"We therefore hold that payments that become due and payable under a temporary order
may be reduced to judgment after the entry of the fmal decree, despite the failure of that
decree to expressly preserve them."
Therefore, the alimony due and owing, under the temporary order, may be
rendered to judgment following the entry of the Decree of Divorce. HOWEVER, the
temporary order ceases to exist and the permanent order, as set forth in the Amended
Decree of Divorce, is controlling as to the issues of child support and alimony.
The Respondent is not able to just "assume51 the terms of the temporary order after
the new order was entered which reserved the Petitioner's claims that lower amounts
should be entered. "When a temporary is followed by a permanent order, the temporary
order merges into the permanent order." See Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 885
P.2d 990,994, (Utah 1993) and also Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001). In
this case, the prior amounts of child support and alimony were not reaffirmed, but were
reserved - that is no orders were made and it was anticipated that there would be new
order for the alimony and child support to be awarded effective with the entry of the
Decree.
It should be noted that the Court's decision in Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d
814 (Utah App. 1992), which is referenced in the trial court's decision is inapposite to the
issues in this case. See, R. 690-91. As carefully explained above, the Appellant is not
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seeking to amend a temporary order. Appellant recognizes that he had six months to seek
the review of the temporary order that governed the alimony and child support levels to
October 1, 2004. Appellant acknowledges that no review of that order and time period
was requested.

Appellant vehemently asserts that the temporary order, however,

terminated with the entry of the Decree in October, 2004.
POINT IV: EQUITY DICTATES THAT THE COURT ALLOW A
FULL HEARING ON THE ISSUES ATTENDANT TO ALIMONY
AND CHILD SUPPORT.
In each of the statutes relating to alimony and child support cited herein and in the
interpreting case law, the court's determination of the level of child support and alimony
is to be guided by principles of equity. A hearing on the required elements of both
alimony and child support has not been conducted in this case and the facts and
information required to set a legal amount have not been tendered to the court. Certainly,
the parties are entitled to a ruling that would allow a complete hearing and the setting of
child support and alimony that is mandated by the financial information supplied by the
parties.
Enforcing the terms of the temporary order, after the entry of the Decree would not
be fair and equitable. For instance, the Record in this case does contain the response of
the Respondent's employer, Financial Freedom to a subpoena, which details a monthly
salary for the Respondent of $3,000 that existed clear back to June, 2005. (R. 613-622)
The representation in the Temporary Order of August 11, 2004 that the Respondent was
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unemployed did not reflect the Respondent's circumstances after the Decree. Appellant
believes that the Respondent was employed around the time of the entry of the Decree.
The Appellant/Petitioner employment at the time of the August 11, 2004
Temporary Hearing failed. He was employed in 2006 for a monthly salary of $4,375.00
per month, net.

His monthly expenses assuming only a $3,000 payment to the

Respondent are over $8,000 a month. (R. 789-96) The Appellee/Respondent has not filed,
at an time in this case, a financial declaration relating to her income and expenses.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the law and the facts of this case, Appellant requests an order
reversing the district court's determination and adjudging that the Temporary Order of
August 11, 2004, terminated on the entry of the Decree of Divorce, October 7, 2004.
Appellant requests that the matter be remanded for a hearing on child support and
alimony levels and arrearages, if any, to be effective with the entry of the Decree,
October 7, 2004.
Dated thisff2> day of January, 2008 >

'ROSEMOJJtf 6. BLAKELOCK, ESQ
fney for Petitioner/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on theyy day of January, 2008, two copies of the Appellant's Brief
were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

Scott P. Card, Esq.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604
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Addendum

Addendum
Exhibit "A"-Stipulation and Order
of Temporary Support, Dated August 11, 2004
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Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803
MOODY BROWN & BROWN
Attorneys for Respondent
2525 N[. Canyon Rd.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 356-8300
Fax; (SOI) 356-8400

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BENTXEY D.WILSON,

STIPULATION OF TEMPORARY
SUPPORT

Petitioner*

v.
BRENDAH.WTtSON,
Civil No. 034402561 DA
Respondent,
Division No,6

COME NOW the parties undersigned and represent to the Court that the following terms are
fair and reasonable. The parties stipulate and agree, as follows:
1, Children, There have been four children born as issue of this marriage: Paile
C. Wilson, bam November 12,1984; Madelyne A. Wilson, born September U, 1988; Bentlcy D.
Wilson, bom September \ 1,1993; and, William M, Wilson, born May 6,1997.
2, Custodv/P^rent time. The Mother is awarded temporaryCustody of the niiaor
children, subject to the Father's riglit to parent time with the children at reasonable times and
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places as the parties may agree. The holidays will be alternated in accordance with U.C A §303-35; however, the wishes of the children will be considered and the children will not be forced
to participate in parent time. The Father will have alternating weekends with the children from
Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday (one hour before the children's church time commences), The
Father will also have ana week of extended visitation with the children in the summer,
3, Child Support. The Father fftprcsfints His gross monthly income is
approxnnatcly $ 10,000 per month, The Respcmdentk qjramtly unemployed. The Father will
pay child support of $700 per rt\£

•er ptol& ) The child'support obligation of the Father

should be effective Febnwy^, 2004, and continue during the pendency of this action. Each
party will pay one-half all costs of extracurricular activities for the children*

m

4, Alimony. The Wife should be awarded a BVHB*d$37?£Q4ier month as

temporary alimony from the Husband, e o m m e n c i n g ^ ^ f ^ l , 2004, and continuing during the
pendancy of this action,
5. Medical/pental Exposes, The Father will maintain health insurance coverage
for medical and dental expenses far the minor children; The Father shall also pay all costs of the
premium for the medical and dental health insurance, ^ach parent Shall share equally all
reasonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, counseling,
prescriptions, deductibles, and oopaymenta, incurred fcjr the dependent children and actually paid
by the parents
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Dated this
day of Jwie,2004.
«
\

BENfCEY WILSON, Petitioner
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of June, 2004.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Provo>Utah
My Commission Expires: _

Dated thisi_2 cUiy of Jime,2004.

M
BRENDAH, WILSON, Respondent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __2~2W of June, 2004.

<$m^

MARTA W. WHITTiNGTON

c ^ f g § , immPum-siMoiaw
% f l l i S 88? N. UNIVERSITY AVE.
{
00&mj0
PftOVO, UTAH 64(304
''QJE:^

P, 04

C^W EXP. 3-24-2005

HAJAMJUJ muffle
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Provo.Utah
My Commission Expires:
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Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803
MOODY BROWN & BROWN
Attorneys for Respondent
2525 N. Canyon Rd.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801)356-8300
Fax: (801) 356-8400

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BENTLEY D. WILSON,

:

Petitioner,

:

v.

:

BRENDA H. WILSON,

:

ORDER OF TEMPORARY
SUPPORT

Civil No. 034402561 DA
Respondent.

:
Division No.6

Based on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered,
adjudged, and decreed as follows:
1. Children. There have been four children born as issue of this marriage: Daile
C. Wilson, born November 12, 1984; Madelyne A. Wilson, born September 11,1988; Bentley D.
Wilson, born September 11, 1993; and, William M. Wilson, born May 6, 1997.
2. Custody/Parent time. The Mother is awarded temporary physical custody of
the minor children, subject to the Father's right to parent time with the children at reasonable

times and places as the parties may agree. The holidays will be alternated in accordance with
U.C.A. §30-3-35; however, the wishes of the children will be considered and the children will
not be forced to participate in parent time. The Father will have alternating weekends with the
children from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday (one hour before the children's church time
commences). The Father will also have one week of extended visitation with the children in the
summer.
3. Child Support. The Father represents his gross monthly income is
approximately $10,000 per month. The Respondent is currently unemployed. The Father will
pay child support of $700 per month per minor child.

The child support obligation of the Father

shall be effective June 1, 2004, and continue during the pendency of this action. Each party will
pay one-half all costs of extracurricular activities for the children.
4. Credit. The Petitioner shall receive credit for all child support amounts paid
in June 2004, which was $2,250.
5. Alimony. The Wife is awarded a sum of $4,000 per month as temporary
alimony from the Husband, commencing June 1, 2004, and continuing during the pendency of
this action.
6. Medical/Dental Expenses. The Father will maintain health insurance coverage
for medical and dental expenses for the minor children. The Father shall also pay all costs of the
premium for the medical and dental health insurance. Each parent shall share equally all
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reasonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, counseling,
prescriptions, deductibles, and copayments, incurred for the dependent children and actually paid
by the parents.
7. Other Issues. All other issues are reserved and the temporary orders contained
herein may be reviewed upon request of either party.
DATED this j^ifey^-HtrlyrSQM,—-

Approved as to form:

ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK
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NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY
TO: ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Respondent, will submit the
above and foregoing Order of Temporary Support to the Fourth District Court for signature upon the
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of
the State of Utah.

?
Dated this J_

day July,2004.

MARILYN MOODY BROWN
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this o

day of July, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Order of Temporary Support, postage prepaid, to the following:
Rosemond Blakelock
Attorney at Law
75S300W
Provo, UT 84601

lM?UM
Wp\S-Z\wilsoiiB.ord.temp
July 3, 2004

Addendum
Exhibit "B"-Order on Order to Show Cause
Dated August 26, 2004

'0
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183
Attorney for Petitioner
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801)379-0700
Facsimile: (801) 379-0701

BLED
Fourth Ju^'ml District Cou®

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT INI AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

BENTLEY D. WILSON,
Petitioner,

ORDER ON
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

vs.

BRENDA H.WILSON,
Respondent.

Case No. 034402561
Commissioner Patton
Division 6

This matter came on as for hearing on August 5, 2004, before Commissioner Thomas
Patton. Present was the Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent was
not present, nor was she represented by counsel. The Petitioner's counsel, Rosemond Blakelock,
informed the Court that she had received an Appearance of Counsel from James Haskins, but that
no other communication was received other than the Appearance of Counsel. The Court
examined the file and the contents therein and noted that the Respondent had been personally
served with an Order to Show Cause signed by Judge Fred Howard on July 20, 2004. The Court
examined the file and noted that no responsive pleadings of any kind were in the file, and

concluded that the hearing should proceed as ordered and scheduled. Based upon the file and the
contents therein the default of the Respondent was entered and the Court orders as follows;

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
1. The Petitioner is hereby granted the temporary physical custody of the minor
children.
2. The Court shall immediately appoint a custody evaluator and shall order that the
Respondent cooperate with the evaluator so that if the children are in any danger when with the
Respondent that it can be determined.
3. The Petitioner shall pick-up the car, and shall be responsible for the payments
thereon.

DATED and SIGNED this <p ^

day of / k j > ^ . , 2004.

Commissioner Thomas Patton
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James Haskins
357 South 200 East Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RULE 7 NOTICE
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Petitioner has submitted submit
the above and foregoing Order to the Court, for signature. Pursuant to Rule 7 (f)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the order should be filed with the Court, within five
days after service upon you of this notice.
DATED this 6th day of August 2004

RQSEM6ND BLAKELOCK
Attorney for Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing documents to the person(s) addressed above.

CegahAs&tetanf

Addendum
Exhibit "C"-Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce dated October 7, 2004

Fourth Juc&7>£: Omnrt Court
of Utah Ooimw, Sime of Utah

icjolai

-tkDeputy

10" 31 # ^
Rosemond B l a k e l o c k #6183
Attorney for P e t i t i o n e r
7 5 S o u t h 300 West
Provo, Utah
84601
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 7 5 - 7 6 7 8

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BENTLEY D. WILSON,
* DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
v.

*
*
*

BRENDA H. WILSON,

*.

Case No. 034402561

*

Respondent.

*

This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as
for hearing before Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the
Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent
was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The
parties placed their stipulation into the record and each party
affirmed on the record that each understood that once the
stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound
by the terms, as set forth below. The Court accepted the
Affidavit of the Petitioner as to grounds and jurisdiction. The
Court now examines the file and the contents therein and deeming
itself to be fully informed in the premises, having issued
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now orders and rules as
follows;
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1. 1. The bonds of matrimony heretofore existing by and
between the Petitioner and Respondent are hereby dissolved, and
Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the
Respondent.
2. The parties have three minor children: Madelyne Anne born
September 11, 1988, Bentley Dunford II, born September 11,1993
and William McKinley born May 6, 1997.
3.

The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted

joint legal custody of the minor children, with the Respondent
being designated as having the primary physical custody of the
minor children.
4. The Petitioner shall be awarded parenting time with the
minor children as follows;
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule,
the following schedule shall be considered the minimum
parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be entitled:
(a) (i) Wednesday evening from the time the child11 s school
is regularly dismissed until the following morning (Thursday) at
which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to
school. This overnight shall occur In weeks in which the
2

Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end
visitation, on weeks where the Petitioner has week-end

visitation

with the minor children, the week-day visitation shall be from
the time school is out until 8:30 p.m.
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1,
2004, from the time school is out until the following Monday,
October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the
minor children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend
visitation with the minor children shall be every other weekend
from, from Friday following school until the following Monday
morning at which time the Petitioner shall take the children to
school.
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time,
and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating weekend parent-time schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day,
the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the child T s
attendance at school for that school day;
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or
Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so
that the child is free from school and the parent is free from
work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to

3

this lengthier holiday period; or
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent,
parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the
time the childTs school is regularly dismissed at the beginning
of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the
holiday weekend;
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the
Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled to the following
holidays:
(i) child1s birthday on the day before or after the actual
birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of
the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the
birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely
entitled;
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on
the day school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the
Sunday before school resumes;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time
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to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday
until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran1s Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is
equally divided;
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial
parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m.
Until 9:00 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he
may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on
Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely entitled;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at
7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time
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to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as
U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7
p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m.
until Sunday at 7 p.m; and
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation,
including New YearTs Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3) (b)
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as
the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year
holidays in even years and the even year holidays in odd years;
(i) Father1s Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive
father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive
mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the
noncustodial parent;
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(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the
noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to
parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines;
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week
period of uninterrupted time during the children's summer
vacation from school for purposes of vacation;
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the
noncustodial parent's extended parent-time shall be H of the
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks
with the child shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to
the other parent; and
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours•and for
reasonable duration.
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with
this section by either parent concerning parent-time shall be
made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time
order.
7. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and
parenting plan;

7

(A)

parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both

parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution;
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize
the continuity and stability of the children's life;
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to
make the child available to attend family functions

including

funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays,
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of
the child or in the life of either parent which may

inadvertently

conflict with the parent-time schedule;
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times
specified and return the child at the times specified above, and
the children T s regular school hours shall not be interrupted;
(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for
parent-time at the time they are to be picked up and shall be
present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they
are returned;
(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time
schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both
parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the
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noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized
parent-time provided above.
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time
schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the
parties and the expense of exercising parent-time;
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld
due to either parentTs failure to comply with a court-ordered
parent-time schedule;
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social,
sports, and community functions in which the children are
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be
entitled to attend and participate fully;
(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical
records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent
in the event of a medical emergency;
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current
address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change;
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone
contact during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges
with the children;
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(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for
the child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the
parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if
willing and able, to provide child care;
(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers
with the name, current address, and telephone number of the otherparent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name,
current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care
providers unless the court for good cause orders otherwise; and
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of
major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the
parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent
does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the
child on the religious holiday.
5.

Both parties have attended the course entitled "Divorce

Education for Parents" as required by law.
6.

The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child

support and alimony. The issue of whether or not a reduction
should be granted shall be reserved for a period of six months so
that each party is able to obtain further information regarding
the Petitioner's actual income.
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7. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the
minor children during the months of August and September.
Therefore, the issue of the amount of Petitioner7 s actual child
support obligation for August 2004 and September 2 004 is reserved
for final determination by the Court.
8. The financial, real and personal property issues are
reserved.
9. Both parties should be equally responsible and liable for
paying the health, optical, hospital, and dental expenses for the
parties1 minor children, which are uncovered by insurance.

When

health, optical, hospital, or dental insurance is available to
either party at a reasonable cost, that party should obtain the
health insurance and each party should be responsible for onehalf of the cost of insurance for the minor children.
10. Neither party shall do anything to harm, harass or
disparage the other and neither shall allow any third party to
harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is restrained and
prohibited from contacting any business associate or friends of
the other party to discuss the divorce proceedings, custody or
the other party. Neither party shall interfere with the business
or personal activities of the other party. Neither party shall
speak negatively about the other in the presence of the minor
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children and neither party shall discuss custody or litigation
with the minor children.
11. The Petitioner may take the minor children to Dr. Paul
Jenkins or Dr. Randy Hyde as may be necessary for pre or post
visitation sessions with the minor children as may be deemed
necessary and proper. The Petitioner shall be responsible for
costs associated with either Dr. Jenkins or Dr. Hyde.
12. The Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers check in the
amount of $4,434.00 to the Respondent by 5:00 p.m. on September
28, 2004.
13. The Petitioner shall cooperate with the Respondent in
her attempts to get the Toyota returned to her.
14. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for
further hearing by the trial court.

DATED this

/

OCT

day of

12

___, 2004.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

BRIAN HARRISON

Brian Harrison
facsimile: 852-3175
3651 North 100 East, #100
Provo, Utah 84604

RULE 7 NOTICE
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Petitioner has submitted the
above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to the Court, for signature. Pursuant to Rule 7 (f)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the Decree of Divorce should be filed
with the Court, within five days after service upon you of this notice.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2004.

Jorp Pernod for Rosemond Blakelock
Attorney for Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of September, 2004,1 faxed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing documents to the person(s) addressed above.
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Fourth Judinia' - W i t t Court
of UtaS". County, Stale of Utah

^.IPjllMJl^-.- Deputy
Rosemond Blakelock #6183
Attorney for Petitioner
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 375-7678
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BENTLEY D. WILSON,
Petitioner,

k

* FINDINGS OF FACT AND
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
*

v.
BRENDA H. WILSON,
Respondent.

*

Case No. 034402561

*
*

This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as
for hearing before Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the
Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent
was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The
parties placed their stipulation into the record and each party
affirmed on the record that each understood that once the
stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound
by the terms, as set forth below. The Court now examines the file
and the contents therein and deeming itself to be fully informed
in the premises, now orders and rules as follows;

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court finds that the finds that the Petitioner has
been an actual and bona fide resident of Utah County, State of
Utah, for at least three months immediately prior to the filing
of this divorce action.
2.

The Court finds that the parties are wife and husband,

having been married on July 30, 1984, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

The Court finds that the Petitioner should be granted a

divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
4.

The Court finds that the parties have three minor

children: Madelyne Anne born September 11, 1988, Bentley Dunford
II, born September 11,1993 and William McKinley born May 6, 1997.
5.

The Court finds that the Petitioner and the Respondent

should be granted joint legal custody of the minor children, with
the Respondent being designated as having the primary physical
custody of the minor children.
6. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded
parenting time with the minor children as follows;
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule,
the following schedule shall be considered the minimum
parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be entitled:
(a) (i) Wednesday evening from the time the child's school
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is regularly dismissed until the following morning

(Thursday) at

which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to
school. This overnight shall occur in weeks in which the
Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end
visitation, on weeks where the Petitioner has week-end visitation
with the minor children, the week-day visitation shall be from
the time school is out until 8:30 p.m.
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1,
2004, from the time school is out until the following Monday,
October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the
minor children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend
visitation with the minor children shall be every other weekend
from, from Friday following school until the following Monday
morning at which time the Petitioner shall take the children to
school.
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time,
and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating weekend parent-time schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day,
the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the child T s
attendance at school for that school day;
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or
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Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so
that the child is free from school and the parent is free from
work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to
this lengthier holiday period; or
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent,
parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the
time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning
of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the
holiday weekend;
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the
Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled to the following
holidays:
(i) child1s birthday on the day before or after the actual
birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of
the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the
birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely
entitled;
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on
the day school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the
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Sunday before school resumes;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time
to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday
until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran1s Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is
equally divided;
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial
parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m.
;il 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take
other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at. 6 p.m. on
Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent
is completely entitled;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the

'WU'l'AV,

holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely entitled;
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly
known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday
until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7
p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school
vacation, including New Year!s Day, as defined in Subsection
30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9
p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year
holidays in even years and the even year holidays in odd years;
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m.
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on the holiday;
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m.
on the holiday;
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent
may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the
noncustodial parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the
noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to
parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with these guideline
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical
two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation;
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the
noncustodial parent's extended parent-time shall be H of the
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 30 days in
advance to the other parent; and
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(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for
reasonable duration.
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with
this section by either parent concerning parent-time shall be
made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time
order.
7. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and
parenting plan;
(A)

parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both

parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution;
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize
the continuity and stability of the children T s life;
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to
make the child available to attend family functions

including

funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays,
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of
the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently
conflict with the parent-time schedule;
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times
specified and return the child at the times specified above, and
the children's regular school hours shall not be interrupted;
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(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for
parent-time at the time they are to be picked up and shall be
present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they
are returned;
(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time
schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both
parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the
noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized
parent-time provided above.
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time
schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the
parties and the expense of exercising parent-time;
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld
due to either parent T s failure to comply with a court-ordered
parent-time schedule;
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social,
sports, and community functions in which the children are
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be .
entitled to attend and participate fully;
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(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical
records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent
in the event of a medical emergency;
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current
address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change;
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone
contact during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges
with the children;
(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for
the child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the
parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if
willing and able, to provide child care;
(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers
with the name, current address, and telephone number of the other
parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name,
current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care
providers unless the court for good cause orders otherwise; and
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of
major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the
parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent
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does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the
child on the religious holiday.
8.

The Court finds that both parties have attended the

course entitled "Divorce Education for Parents" as required by
law.
9.

The Court finds that the Petitioner has requested a

reduction in both child support and aliraony. The issue of whether
or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved for a
period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income.
10. The Court finds that the Petitioner was awarded the
physical custody of the minor children during the months of
August and September. Therefore, the issue of the amount of
Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court.
11. The Court finds that the financial, real and personal
property issues are reserved.
12. The Court finds that both parties should be equally
responsible and liable for paying the health, optical, hospital,
and dental expenses for the parties1 minor children, which are
uncovered by insurance.

When health, optical, hospital, or

dental insurance is available to either party at a reasonable
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cost, that party should obtain the health insurance and each
party should be responsible for one-half of the cost of insurance
for the minor children.
13. The Court finds that neither party shall do anything to
harm, harass or disparage the other and neither shall allow any
third party to harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is
restrained and prohibited from contacting any business associate
or friends of the other party to discuss the divorce proceedings,
custody or the other party. Neither party shall interfere with
the business or personal activities of the other party. Neither
party shall speak negatively about the other in the presence of
the minor children and neither party shall discuss custody or
litigation with the minor children.
14. The Court finds that the Petitioner may take the minor
children to Dr. Paul Jenkins or Dr. Randy Hyde as may be
necessary for pre or post visitation sessions with the minor
children as may be deemed necessary and proper. The Petitioner
shall be responsible for costs associated with either Dr. Jenkins
or Dr. Hyde.
15. The Court finds that Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers
check in the amount of $4,434.00 to the Respondent by 5:00 p.m.
on September 28, 2004.
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15. The Court finds that the Petitioner shall cooperate with
the Respondent in her attempts to get the Toyota returned to her.
16. The Court finds that all other issues not resolved
herein are reserved for further hearing by the trial court.
BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now issues
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court concludes as a matter of law that it has

subject and personal jurisdiction over the parties and issues of
the case.
2.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that the

Petitioner is entitled to an Decree of Divorce from the
Respondent, based upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
3. The Court concludes that a Decree of Divorce should
enter, consistent with the Findings of Fact, as set forth above.
,

DATED this

7

day of

6c:r

BY THE COURT:

, 2004

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

BRIAN HARRISON

Brian Harrison
facsimile: 852-3175
3651 North 100 East, #100
Provo, Utah 84604

RULE 7 NOTICE
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Petitioner has submitted the
above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court, for signature. Pursuant
to Rule 7 (f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law should be filed with the Court, within five days after service upon you
of this notice.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2004.

John jPenrod forRosemond Blakelock
tomey:for Petitioner
Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of September, 2004,1 faxed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing documents to the person(s) addressed above.

A . \ h K v ^ \IA A
Legal Assistant

a

Addendum
Exhibit "D"-Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce dated November 2, 2004

hILbU
Fourth Judicial Ofvuz Court
of Utah Ooun-A $!:&;£ of Utah

lljjAai^^L

Deputy

Rosemond Blakelock #6183
Attorney for Petitioner
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 375-7678

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

BENTLEY D.WILSON,

*

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

*

Case No. 034402561

Petitioner,
v.
BRENDA H.WILSON,

*

Respondent.

*
*

?
TV\k\(AA

This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as for hearing before
Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock.
The Respondent was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The parties placed
their stipulation into the record and each party affirmed on the record that each understood that
once the stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound by the terms, as set forth
below. The Court accepted the Affidavit of the Petitioner as to grounds and jurisdiction. The
Court now examines the file and the contents therein and deeming itself to be fully informed in

the premises, having issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now orders and rules as
follows;
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1. The bonds of matrimony heretofore existing by and between the Petitioner and
Respondent are heieby dissolved, and Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the
Respondent.
2 The parties have three minor children: Madelyne Anne, bom September 11, 1988;
Bentley Dunford II, bom September 11,1993; and William McKinley, bom May 6, 1997.
3. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted joint legal custody of the minor
children, with the Respondent being designated as having the primary physical custody of the
minor children.
4. The Petitioner shall be awarded parenting time with the minor children as follows;
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule
shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be
entitled:
(a) (i) Wednesday evening, at 4:30 p.m., until the following morning (Thursday)
at which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to school. This overnight shall occur
in weeks in which the Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end visitation, on
weeks where the Petitioner has week-end visitation with the minor children, the week-day
visitation shall be from 4:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. The pick-up and drop-off for the minor children
shall be at curbside for all visitation exchanges.
2

(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1, 2004, from 4:30 p.m.
until the following Monday, October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the minor
children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend visitation with the minor children shall be
every other weekend from, from Friday at 4:30 p.m. until the following Monday morning at
which time the Petitioner shall take the children to school.
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not
be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent
shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day;
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free
from work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent, parent-time over a
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from 4:30 p.m. on the day that the child's school is
regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the
holiday weekend;
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled
to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3
p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along
3

for the birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m.
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely
entitled;
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out
for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled,
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m.
on the holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection
30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is
equally divided;
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the
following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m.
until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other
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siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on
the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely
entitled;
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend
beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on
the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's
Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m.,
so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays m even years and the
even year holidays in odd years;
5

(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines;
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted
time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation;
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's
extended parent-time shall be lA of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration.
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either
parent concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the
parent-time order.
6

5. The parties will do their best to comply with schedule expectations. However, they
understand that delays or problems are unavoidable. Either party shall notify the other if there
will be a delay of more than fifteen minutes. Respondent shall have the children ready for
visitation within 15 minutes of the times set forth herein and the Petitioner shall return the
children within 15 minutes of the time set forth herein.
6. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and parenting plan;
(A)

parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable

to a court-imposed solution;
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and
stability of the children's life;
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available
to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays,
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either
parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule;
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times specified and return the
child at the times specified above, and the children's regular school hours shall not be interrupted;
(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for parent-time at the time
they are to be picked up and shall be present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they are returned;
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(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the
noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time provided above.
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably
accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time;
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's
failure to comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule;
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24 hours of receiving notice
of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the children are
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be entitled to attend and participate fully;
(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school reports including
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency;
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone
number within 24 hours of any change;
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during
reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the children;
(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate
care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if
willing and able, to provide child care;
8

(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current
address, and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with
the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court
for good cause orders otherwise; and
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent
does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
7.

Both parties have attended the course entitled "Divorce Education for Parents" as

required by law.
8.

The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which has

previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and alimony which has been
ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. The issue of whether or not a reduction should be
granted shall be reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income.
9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children during the
months of August and September. Therefore, the issue of the amount of Petitioner's actual child
support obligation for August 2004 and September 2004 is reserved for final determination by
the Court.
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10. All other issues are reserved.
11. Both parties should be equally responsible and liable for paying the health, optical,
hospital, and dental expenses for the parties' minor children, which are uncovered by insurance.
When health, optical, hospital, or dental insurance is available to either party at a reasonable cost,
that party should obtain the health insurance and each party should be responsible for one-half of
the cost of insurance for the minor children.
12. Neither party shall do anything to harm, harass or disparage the other and neither shall
allow any third party to harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is restrained and
prohibited from contacting any business associate or friends of the other party to discuss the
divorce proceedings, custody or the other party. Neither party shall interfere with the business or
personal activities of the other party. Neither party shall speak negatively about the other in the
presence of the minor children and neither party shall discuss custody or litigation with the minor
children.
13. The Petitioner may take the minor children to Dr. Paul Jenkins or Dr. Randy Hyde as
may be necessary for pre or post visitation sessions with the minor children as may be deemed
necessary and proper. The Petitioner shall be responsible for costs associated with either Dr.
Jenkins or Dr. Hyde.
14. The Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers check in the amount of $4,434.00 to the
Respondent by 5:00 p.m. on September 28, 2004.
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15. The Petitioner shall cooperate with the Respondent and third parties in her attempts to
get the Toyota returned to her.
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by the trial court.

DATED this

^

day of

AW-

, 2004.

BY THE COURT:
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Brian Harrison
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Rosemond Blakelock #6183
Attorney for Petitioner
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 375-7678

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

BENTLEY D.WILSON,
Petitioner,

* AMENDED
* FINDINGS OF FACT AND
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
*
*

v.
BRENDAH. WILSON,
Respondent.

* Case No. 034402561
*

This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as for hearing before
Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock.
The Respondent was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The parties placed
their stipulation into the record and each party affirmed on the record that each understood that
once the stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound by the terms, as set forth
below. The Court now examines the file and the contents therein and deeming itself to be fully
informed in the premises, now orders and rules as follows;
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court finds that the finds that the Petitioner has been an actual and bona fide
resident of Utah County, State of Ulah, for at least three months immediately prior to the filing of
this divorce action.
2. The Court finds that the parties are wife and husband, having been married on July 30,
1984, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be granted a divorce on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences.
4. The Court finds that the parties have three minor children: Madelyne Anne, bom
September 11,1988; Bentley Dunford II, born September 11,1993; and William McKinley, born
May 6, 1997.
5. The Court finds that the Petitioner and the Respondent should be granted joint legal
custody of the minor children, with the Respondent being designated as having the primary
physical custody of the minor children.
6. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded parenting time with the minor
children as follows;
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule
shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be
entitled:
(a) (i) Wednesday evening, at 4:30 p.m., until the following morning (Thursday)
at which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to school. This overnight shall occur
2

in weeks in which the Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end visitation, on
weeks where the Petitioner has week-end visitation with the minor children, the week-day
visitation shall be from 4:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. The pick-up and drop-off for the minor children
shall be at curbside for all visitation exchanges.
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1, 2004, from 4:30 p.m.
until the following Monday, October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the minor
children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend visitation with the minor children shall be
every other weekend from, from Friday at 4:30 p.m. until the following Monday morning at
which time the Petitioner shall take the children to school.
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not
be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent
shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day;
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free
from work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent, parent-time over a
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from 4:30 p.m. on the day that the child's school is
regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the
holiday weekend;
3

(f) in years ending in an odd number, the Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled
to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3
p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along
for the birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m.
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely entitled;
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out
for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely
entitled;
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the
holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m.
on the holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection
30~3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Cliristmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is
equally divided;
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(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the
following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m.
until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other
siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the
holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely
entitled;
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend
beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on
the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's
5

Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m.,
so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the
even year holidays in odd years;
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother eveiy year
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial
parent consistent with these guidelines;
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted
time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation;
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's
extended parent-time shall be lA of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and
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(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration.
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either
parent concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the
parent-time order.
7. The court finds that the parties shall do their best to comply with schedule
expectations. However, they understand that delays or problems are unavoidable. Either party
shall notify the other if there will be a delay of more than fifteen minutes. Respondent shall have
the children ready for visitation within 15 minutes of the times set forth herein and the Petitioner
shall return the children within 15 minutes of the time set forth herein.
8. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and parenting plan;
(A) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable
to a court-imposed solution;
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and
stability of the children's life;
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available
to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays,
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either
parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule;
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times specified and return the
child at the times specified above, and the children's regular school hours shall not be interrupted;
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(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for parent-time at the time
they are to be picked up and shall be present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they are returned;
(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the
noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time provided above.
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably
accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time;
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's
failure to comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule;
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24 hours of receiving notice
of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the children are
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be entitled to attend and participate folly;
(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school reports including
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency;
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone
number within 24 hours of any change;
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during
reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the children;
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(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate
care and the court shall encourage the pailies to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if
willing and able, to provide child care;
(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current
address, and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with
the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court
for good cause orders otherwise; and
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent
does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
9. The Court finds that both parties have attended the course entitled "Divorce Education
for Parents" as required by law.
10. The Court finds that the Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support,
which has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and alimony which
has been ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. The issue of whether or not a reduction
should be granted shall be reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain
further information regarding the Petitioner's actual income.
11. The Court finds that the Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor
children during the months of August and September. Therefore, the issue of the amount of
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Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and September 2004 is reserved for
final determination by the Court.
12. The Court finds that all other issues are reserved.
13. The Court finds that both parties should be equally responsible and liable for paying
the health, optical, hospital, and dental expenses for the parties' minor children, which are
uncovered by insurance. When health, optical, hospital, or dental insurance is available to either
party at a reasonable cost, that party should obtain the health insurance and each party should be
responsible for one-half of the cost of insurance for the minor children.
14. The Court finds that neither party shall do anything to harm, harass or disparage the
other and neither shall allow any third party to harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is
restrained and prohibited from contacting any business associate or friends of the other party to
discuss the divorce proceedings, custody or the other party. Neither party shall interfere with the
business or personal activities of the other party. Neither party shall speak negatively about the
other in the presence of the minor children and neither party shall discuss custody or litigation
with the minor children.
15. The Court finds that the Petitioner may take the minor children to Dr. Paul Jenkins or
Dr. Randy Hyde as may be necessary for pre or post visitation sessions with the minor children as
may be deemed necessary and proper. The Petitioner shall be responsible for costs associated
with cither Dr. Jenkins or Dr. Hyde.
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16. The Court finds that Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers check in the amount of
$4,434.00 to the Respondent by 5:00 p.m. on September 28, 2004.
17. The Court finds that the Petitioner shall cooperate with the Respondent and third
parties in her attempts to get the Toyota returned to her.
18. The Court finds that all other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further
hearing by the trial court.
BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now issues the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The court concludes as a matter of law that it has subject and personal jurisdiction
over the parties and issues of the case.
2. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Petitioner is entitled to an Decree of
Divorce from the Respondent, based upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
3. The Court concludes that a Decree of Divorce should enter, consistent with the
Findings of Fact, as set forth above.

DATED this

£-

day of

fJoV-

, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Brian Harrison
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BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C.
Brian C. Harrison (#1388)
Attorney for Respondent
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7700

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BENTLEY WILSON,
Petitioner,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

•vs-

BRENDA WILSON,
Civil No.

Respondent,

034402561

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the
September 18, 200 6, Petitioner being present and represented
by his attorney, Rosemond Blakelock, and the Respondent being
present and represented by her attorney, Brian C. Harrison,
and the Court having considered the argument of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

A

twenty-five

(25) minute

rule

shall

apply

for

visitation purposes and all pick-up and drop-off shall be

curbside.
2.
for

Respondent is granted a judgment against Petitioner

delinquent

child

support

and

alimony

$108,116.00 through September, 2006.

in

the

sum

of

This judgment is based

upon the following:
a.

The Court's prior Order of August 10, 2004 for
temporary child support and alimony has not
been modified;

b.

Petitioner

requested

a

reduction

in

child

support and alimony on September 27, 2004, and
his request was reserved for a period of six
(6) months.

Petitioner failed

to take any

action during said six (6) months and therefor
the temporary Order remains in full force and
effect;
C.

The

Court

finds

that

the

burden

to

move

forward on Petitioner' s request for reduction
was Petitioner's burden and not Respondent's;
d.

Petitioner recognized his support obligation
by making periodic payments, but

2

failed to

take

any

action

to

have

his

request

for

reduction considered by the court.
3.

Petitioner is granted two (2) weeks from September

18, 200 6 to show evidence of payments which he has made and
for which he has not received credit.
The issue of attorney's fees is reserved.
DATED:

tflJPt^

^(fafiL
t "/->%

BY THE COURT

DISTRICT

1/

COMMISSIONER

Approved as to Form:

Rosemond Blakelock
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m^^/

NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY
TO:

ROSE BLAKELOCK

The foregoing ORDER will be submitted to the Court for
execution and entry.

Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or
five (5) days plus three (3) days after mailing for opposing
parties to submit notice of objection.

If such objection is

not received within the prescribed time period, the ORDER
will be submitted for signing and entry by the Court.
DATED this

rz

^ day of September, 2006.

Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY

that

I personally

mailed

true and correct copy of the foregoing on this
C&pWX\)D&Y'

# 2006,

by

first-class

U.S. mail,

postage

Fax No. 379-0701
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a

day of

Rose Blakelock
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601

"

^

faxed

r

prepaid, to the following:

Sectjltary

and

Addendum
Exhibit "F"-Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment dated March 27, 2007

"; Uo-jray, Stc/;-i
-?
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US

SCOTT P. CARD (#6847)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801)426-8200
Facsimile: (801) 426-8208
Attorneys for Respondent
IN TLIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BENTLEY WILSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW and JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
(Hearing date: Jan. 2, 2007)
Case No: 034402561

vs.
BRENDA HALTON WILSON,
Respondent.

The above entitled matter came before the Court at a hearing on January 2, 2007. The
Petitioner, Bentley Wilson originally brought this matter through a written Motion and from oral
argument received on January 2, 2007, wherein he objects to the Commissioner's Judgment in
favor of Respondent entered on September 18, 2006. Petitioner's Objection is granted in part
and denied in part.
Findings of Fact
1.

On August 11, 2004, a Temporary Order was entered regarding alimony and child

support. In that Order respondent was given temporary physical custody and Petitioner was

awarded visitation. In that Order child support was set for $700 per-month per-child and $4,000
per-month of alimony was awarded to Respondent.
2.

On August 26, 2004, custody was changed to the Petitioner and Respondent was

given visitation.
3.

On September 22, 2004, another order was entered into a Stipulation which

resulted in a Decree of Divorce, which was signed and entered on October 7, 2004. It appears
that Petitioner had custody of the children from August 26, 2004 to October 7, 2004.
4.

The Divorce Decree changed custody from the Petitioner to the Respondent. The

Decree reserved the issue of what amounts Petitioner needed to pay for the months of August and
September of 2004. The section of the Decree that is most germane to this Ruling is paragraph
eight which reads:
The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and alimony. The
issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved for a
period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further information
regarding Petitioner's actual income. (Emphasis added)
5.

Six months came and passed and the Petitioner failed to file a document with the

court, or make any attempt to verify his allegedly modified income.
6.

The Commissioner held a hearing on September 18, 2006, wherein he considered

the facts that are presently before this court. The Commissioner held in part that 1: the
Temporary Order from August 11, 2004, was not modified and remained in force, 2) Petitioner
had failed to take any action during the six months in which he could have altered the Temporary
2

Order, 3) Petitioner owed $108,116.00 through September, 2006.
7.

The Commissioner's decision was based on the information provided by the

parties and appellate court decisions. The commissioner discussed the Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d
633 (Utah 1987), case, but found that the Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App.
1992) decision was more applicable to the facts before the court. The Commissioner noted that
Whitehead stood for the general rule that "once temporary support obligations become due, they
are no more retroactively modifiable than final decrees" but also provided for some exceptions to
this rule. The Commissioner noted that Petitioner asked the court to "carve out an exception to
the general mle prohibiting retroactive modification of family support obligations." Id. At 816. It
was the finding of the Commissioner that the time for applying any such exception to the general
rule lapsed when Petitioner failed to act within the six months contemplated by the Divorce
Decree. He therefore entered Judgment in favor of the Respondent, holding Petitioner
responsible for any and all obligations for which he could not provide proof of payment for
within two weeks.
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, hereby enters the following
Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
CONCL USIONS OF LA WAND JUDGMENT
1.

Having carefully considered the Commissioner findings, the relevant case law,

and the arguments offered by the parties the Petitioner's Objection is granted in part, and denied
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in part.
2.

The judgment recommended by the Commissioner was $108,116.00. This court

is persuaded that Petitioner should not be responsible for the child support payments from
August 26, 2004, to October 7, 2004, when the Divorce Decree was signed. This court is aware
that child support orders typically remain in force despite a temporary custody change, as agreed
by the parties. In this instance, however, the court will excuse Petitioner from payment of child
support for a month and a half, which is effectively the amount of time he had custody of the
children. The exact amount excused is $700 per-child for the month, and $350 per-child for the
half month. It should be noted, however, that Petitioner is still responsible for alimony for this
time period. Therefore, Judgment is granted to the Respondent, Brenda Wilson, against the
Petitioner in the amount of $107,066.00 for his past child support and alimony obligations owed
through September 2006.
3.

This court does not believe that the Commissioner wrongfully entered judgment

based on Temporary Orders that were superseded by the Divorce Decree, and thereby denies this
portion of Petitioner's objection. This decision is supported by the Divorce Decree and the
relevant case law.
4.

Petitioner alleges that the "temporary orders merged into the Decree of Divorce

and cannot be enforced when the Decree of Divorce does not specifically continue the temporary
orders." Petitioner discussed the case of Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987) which holds
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that, "payments that become due and payable under a temporary order may be reduced to
judgment after entry of the final decree, despite the failure of that decree to expressly preserve
them." Petitioner argues that this holding is inapplicable to the present facts because the "Decree
is specifically different than the temporary orders."
5.

While the Decree and Order are different they are not mutually exclusive, and in

fact the Decree implicitly adopts the Temporary Order. Paragraph eight demonstrates this when
it notes,
(t)he Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and alimony. The
issue of whether or not a redaction should be granted shall be reserved for period
of six months so that each party is able to obtain further information regarding
Petitioner's actual income.
6.

In order for an award to be reduced the award must have existed in the first place.

This paragraph implicitly acknowledges that Petitioner is seeking a reduction of the Temporary
Order. The $700 per-child and $4,000 in alimony are the only amounts that had ever been
entered and are logically the amounts referred to in the Decree.
7.

As the Whitehead court observed there are some exceptions to the general rule

prohibiting the modification of temporary support obligations, however, Petitioner cannot avail
himself of these exceptions. As the Decree notes, the Petitioner had six months to provide
accurate information regarding his income and thereby adjust the wards entered in the Temporary
Order. Petitioner failed to take any action during this time when the possibility of modification
existed. It is therefore disingenuous for Petitioner to now claim that the inclusion of the
5

Temporary Order in the Decree was wrongful when its inclusion was the direct result of his
inaction.
8.

In Summary, the Objection to the Commissioner's recommendation is granted in

part and denied in part. The Objection is well taken inasmuch as Petitioner should not owe for
the amount of time the children were in his custody. The Objection is denied, however, as it
relates to inclusion of the Temporary Order in the Divorce Decree. It is the finding of this court
that the Temporary Order entered on August 11, 2004, was implicitly adopted by Decree of
Divorce and that the Judgment entered by the Commissioner was correct with the excused
amounts listed in paragraph 2 in this section entitled Conclusions of Law and Judgment above.

DATED this 3LL

da

y of jTW^OO^.

....

m^

District Court Judg^ /
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the / > day of /^>^C
copy of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid.
Rosemond Blakelock
75 South 3 00 West
Provo, UT 84601
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"''-/ / v : j ......

, 200_^4 mailed a true and correct

U.R.C.P. RULE 7(f) NOTICE
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment has been submitted to
the Court for execution and entry. Rule 7(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows five
(5) days following hand-delivery, or five (5) days plus three (3) days for mailing if service by
mail, for opposing counsel or opposing parties to submit notice of objection. If such objection as
to form is not received within the prescribed time period, the Order will be submitted for signing
by the Court.
DATED this

/ 3

day of

/ t ^ C ^
v

, 200 2
J_

SCOTT^PjCA^t),ESQ y
Attomgyfor [respondent]

